Most defensive coordinators of quality, I believe, will spend the majority of practice time preparing to stop the tendencies of an opponent’s offense.  These tendencies are typically classified by down and distance.

Example: On 3 & 13, Rick Dykes is most likely to call:

A.  Option to the short side of the field.

B. Playaction pass.

C. Screen.

D. All of the above.

The correct answer is A, but getting 10-12 reps a day on B and C should have you covered with regards to preparation.

Many football folks I am acquainted with tend to value defensive efficiency numbers such as 3rd down coversion percent, yards per play, red zone defense and points per game.  Certainly relevant stats by anyone’s standards.  However, given that you’ll see only 10-12 snaps of 3rd and long football at most in a game, I prefer any type of measurement that places a significant amount of weight on the other 60 plays.  Approximately 65%-70% of the snaps in any single game will be in a 1st down or 2nd and long scenario.  It doesn’t matter what type of offensive or defensive schematics are employed.  3rd down defense is a critical measuring stick, but getting there is even more critical.  Take a 75-play offensive game, 50 of those snaps will be ran on 1st down or 2nd and long, and 8-10 will be ran on 3rd and long.  On the remaining 15 of any down and distance other than that, the odds start to heavily swing in the favor of the team with the ball, and from those scenarios, most first downs are generated.  i.e. Much better chance of converting for a first down on 3rd and 1 than 2nd and 8.  With this train of thought in mind, we’ll focus on the 50 snaps in which most football is played.

To fully understand this angle, the definition of a successful play must be defined.  I define that simply as any play that avoids the situation of 3rd and long (7 yards or more).  There are only two possible plays to defend.  A run or a pass.  Just about every team is going to throw the ball on 3rd and long, which is why most defenses struggle defending mobile QBs.  You still have to consider run.  The play charting of a team’s snaps usually provides a clear indication of what an offense likes to do.  Especially, on the 1st down or 2nd and long plays.  This is where OCs/Playcallers will spend their bread-and-butter stuff.

Example: 2009 OSU Offense vs. Tech Defense

1st down plays – 34

1st down runs – 24

2nd and longs – 20

2nd and long runs – 12

So, 67% of the time against Tech, the Cowboys ran the ball on 1st down and 2nd and long.  I’m guessing that’s around their average.

2009 OU Offense vs. Tech Defense

1st down plays – 27

1st down runs – 15

2nd and longs – 11

2nd and long runs – 1

That kind of surprised me that Kevin Wilson only ran the ball one time on 2nd and long.  Not sure if that is typical of OU since the injuries, but curious at a minimum.  The 56% run plays on 1st down sounds in character for Oklahoma football.  We’re of course setting all this up to take a look at our own team.  We’ve played 4 defenses whom are considered solid by most standards, Texas, Nebraska, Oklahoma State, and Oklahoma.  Our offensive production (National Defensive Rank):

Texas (3) – 24 points, 420 yards, 3 turnovers

Nebraska (8) – 24 points, 259 yards, no turnovers

OSU (31) – 17 points, 357 yards, 3 turnovers

OU (11) – 41 points, 549 yards, 1 turnover

An average of 396 yards and 26.5 points per game, not shabby considering the mean yielded by those units on a weekly basis is 284 total yards and 15 points.  Steven Sheffield was our least productive QB in those contests.  Let’s take out the OU game for anomaly’s sake, and the number drops to 345 yards and 22 points prior to that performance.  Still an upgrade over the average offense, but unfortunately, not turnover-proof production.  I’ve gone to great lengths here as one of our typical meaningless stats that I peruse over each week has jumped to my attention.

We’re a fairly predictable offensive football team with a rich history of execution.  Much like the wishbone.  You know there’s a pretty good chance we’re going to throw the ball.  As DCs have gained more experience in defending our spread attack, they have began to call our bluff on the run game.  In other words, they’ll align an extra man in the box knowing pass plays are called and run plays are a numerical check.  The QB accounts for the extra man and you’ve successfully stopped the Tech running game without ever having one called on you.

The problem this creates for a QB is that it eventually works the spread out of the spread offense.  We’re trying to spread the field vertically over layers of short, medium and long distances.  Since DCs are bluffing our run game and playing pass all the way with LBs on the short-to-medium routes, we’re only left with long passing plays facing under/over coverage on the outside……….where we aren’t necessarily fast on one side and necessarily consistent catching the football on the other.  We’ll call this effect, playcall “crunching”. Does that make sense?  Teams with speed in the back 7 are able to beat us to the spot of our route tendencies on certain down and distances.  Or, execute actual defensive plays to score, like running an ILB at the snap of the ball under an out route on 1st and 10 with the appearance of soft CB coverage to the weakside.  Circumstances are magnified if we fall behind as DCs begin flying DEs upfield at that point.

“Coach Stoops, they don’t run this play on 2nd and 17.”

We were faced with this same issue in 2006 during Graham Harrell’s first season as a starter.  The best college WR on the planet bailed us out with a 2-year lease and a false sense of security.  You’ve immediately “spread” the field with a guy like Crabtree in the game.  The problem is guys like him may never come around again.  Yeah, screen and shuttle passes to the RB can be considered our run game, but that’s not really my take on the situation.  I consider them in the same category as handoffs, WR hitch screens, and shallow crossing routes.  Plays that are designed to attack the short layer of the field.

The primary issue with screen and shuttle passes to the RB for farsighted correction in a spread offense is the ease in which they can be defended with preparation.  I attribute this to the RB turning his back on the play for a nominal amount of time in pre-launch.  Easy play to make with easy reads given you aren’t required to respect another aspect of the offense.  I also factor that anytime the ball proceeds airborne an inherent risk is included.  Something I’m comfortable with in our system as we’re a team that’s built for 3rd and 10.  Which is why I’ve asked myself on numerous occasions in the past why we’re scared of 3rd and 6?

A failed screen pass on 1st and 10 turns into 2nd and 12 turns into a sack/fumble/concussion.  Without a natural long layer threat, any offense becomes a liability against a good defense, especially if short layer opportunities aren’t shifting the playcalling odds in your favor.  I’ve never focused on balance in production, only balance in playcalling.  I’ll post our tendencies from the subject 4 games on 1st down or 2nd and long, and allow you to draw your own conclusions.  I’m anxious to hear:

Tech vs. Texas

1st down or 2nd and long plays – 54

1st down or 2nd and long runs – 8 (15%)

Runs over 3 yards – 4/8 (50% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Passes over 3 yards – 27/46 (52% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Tech vs. Nebraska

1st down or 2nd and long plays – 34

1st down or 2nd and long runs - 13 (38%)

Runs over 3 yards – 10/13 (77% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Passes over 3 yards – 8/21 (38% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Tech vs. OSU

1st down or 2nd and long plays – 47

1st down or 2nd and long runs - 12 (25%)

Runs over 3 yards – 8/12 (67% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Passes over 3 yards – 18/35 (51% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Tech vs. OU

1st down or 2nd and long plays – 61

1st down or 2nd and long runs - 23 (38%)

Runs over 3 yards – 13/23 (57% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

Passes over 3 yards – 20/38 (53% chance of not being in 2nd or 3rd and long)

An editor’s note should include that we ran the ball 40% of the time (8/20) on 2nd and long against the Sooners versus 14% (2/14) against OSU.  We rushed for 79 yards and a TD on those 8 plays in the OU game and 17 yards on the 2 carries in the OSU contest.  In other words, we’ve averaged 9.6 yards per carry in the last two weeks on 2nd and long.

This will never work on 2nd and 8!!!

At the end of the day, these are just more stats.  However, it does seem to reveal to me a couple of tendencies.  Most relevant to myself is that the odds aren’t any worse for reaching 2nd or 3rd and short if we hand the ball off.  At a minimum, we can avoid turnovers.